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THE CASE FOR HIGHLY GRADUATED RATES, IN
STATE INCOME TAXES
ROBERT I. KELLER*
INTRODUCTION
There exists today in the United States a major but rarely men-
tioned indirect program of general revenue sharing' between the federal
government and the state and local governments. This program, which
should not be confused with the program of direct general revenue
sharing enacted by the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972,2
is administered by the United States Treasury Department. The
amount of federal tax receipts disbursed under the program to any
given state or local government is, however, entirely within the control
of the state or local government itself. This is because the amount dis-
tributed is determined solely by two factors: (1) the total amount of
tax revenue that the state or local government can collect; and, (2)
the federal marginal tax brackets of the taxpayers from whom such
revenue is collected.'
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland. B.S., 1963, University
of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1966, Harvard University.
1. The concept of revenue sharing has been described as:
[a strategy under which] . . . a portion of federal tax receipts are disbursed by
means of a predetermined formula to state and local governments, with few
strings attached. Washington's role is that of collecting taxes and distributing
the receipts to lower levels of government; it is not involved in designing, ad-
ministering, or regulating the specific public services on which the money is
spent. ...
Two types of revenue sharing may be encompassed by this strategy: general
revenue sharing, under which the recipient units of government are free to use
their grants as they see fit, and special revenue sharing, or block grants, under
which the recipients must spend their grants on programs in a broad functional
area, such as education or urban development.
E. FRIED, A. RIVLIN, C. SCHULTZE & N. TEETERS, SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES
THE 1974 BUDGET 266 (1973).
2. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-64 (Supp. II, 1972).
3. The funds allocated to state and local governments under the State and Local
Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 are disbursed using a multiple factor approach:
The money is first allocated among the states. Each state as an area is allotted
the amount available to it under either the original Senate version or the original
House version of the general revenue sharing plan, whichever is greater. Under
the Senate's distribution formula the revenue is divided among the states according
to their total populations, relative incomes, and tax efforts (that is, the ratio of
total taxes collected to personal income); the House version of the formula
includes, in addition, urbanized population and state income tax collections. One-
(617)
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The program is identified in the Tax Expenditure Budget of the
United States4 as the "deductibility of nonbusiness State and local
taxes (other than on owner-occupied homes and gasoline)," 5 and is
listed in that budget under the appropriate heading: "[r] evenue sharing
and general purpose fiscal assistance."6 The estimated cost to the federal
third of each state's allotment is given to the state government to use as it sees
fit. The remaining two-thirds is divided among the county areas of the state
on the basis of each county's population, tax effort, and relative income.
E. FRIED, A. RIVLIN, C. SCHULTZE & N. TEETERS, supra note 1, at 279-80 (emphasis
added).
For purposes of this article, it is important to note that the House formula
relies in part on "state income tax collections." If, as suggested herein, a state moves
to an increased reliance on the income tax as a source of revenue, that state will
effectively be increasing its share of both the indirect revenue sharing grants under
the federal tax system and the direct revenue sharing grants under the State and
Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972.
4. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 1976, at 101-17 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as SPECIAL ANALYSES].
The phrase "tax expenditures" was first used in a 1967 speech by Professor
Stanley S. Surrey, then Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy in the Treasury Depart-
ment.
The speech pointed out that those provisions of the federal income tax containing
special exemptions, exclusions, deductions, and other tax benefits were really
methods of providing governmental financial assistance. These special provisions
were not part of the structure required for the income tax itself, but were
instead Government expenditures made through the tax system. They were
similar in purpose, therefore, to the direct expenditures listed in the regular
budget. But since they provided their assistance through the route of tax re-
duction rather than direct aid, . . . [they were called] "tax expenditures."
S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM vii (1973). The "Tax Expenditure Budget"
identifies and quantifies the existing tax expenditures. The Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301-53 (Supp. IV, 1974), requires
that a listing of tax expenditures be included in the regular budget document of the
United States. Section 3(a) (3) of the act defines "tax expenditures" as "those
revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a
special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provides a
special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability." 1 S. SURREY,
W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION CASES AND
MATERIALS 113 n.0d (Supp. 1975).
5. SPECIAL ANALYSES, supra note 4, at 109. The SPECIAL ANALYSES further
explains this item as follows:
The deductibility of nonbusiness State and local taxes provides indirect
assistance to these governments. The deductibility of property taxes on owner-
occupied homes and excise taxes on gasoline are classified elsewhere. The esti-
mates . . . are primarily for the deductibility of State and local income and sales
taxes.
Id. at 114.
6. Id. at 109. The Tax Expenditure Budget also lists under this heading:
"Exclusion of interest on State and local debt," and "Exclusion of income earned in
U.S. possessions." Id.
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government of this revenue sharing program for the fiscal year 1976 is
$9.95 billion. 7
The nature of the general revenue sharing program brought about
by the deductibility of nonbusiness state and local taxes is easily ob-
served. When, for example, a state imposes a $100 tax on a person in
the 50 percent federal income tax bracket, only $50 of the $100 tax is
actually borne by the taxpayer; the remainder is borne by the federal
government. Mechanically, of course, the taxpayer remits the full $100
to the state, but in so doing he is, to the extent of $50, acting as a
mere conduit to pay federal dollars into the state treasury. By deducting
the $100 state tax on his federal income tax return, the state taxpayer
reduces his federal income taxes by $50, and is thus reimbursed to
that extent by the federal government. In effect, then, the state has
imposed a "net tax burden"' of $50 on the 50 percent bracket taxpayer,
and has received a federal matching grant of $50.
In direct expenditure terms,9 the assistance furnished by the federal
government to state and local governments through the itemized de-
7. Id. The equivalent figures for the years 1968, 1971, and 1974 were $2.8
billion, $5.6 billion, and $6.96 billion, respectively. 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P.
McDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION CASES AND MATERIALS 244
(1972); SPECIAL ANALYSES, supra note 4, at 109. By comparison, the direct program
of general revenue sharing established by the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act
of 1972 will have distributed about $302 billion to state and local governments
between January, 1972, and December, 1976, when the program is scheduled for
termination. This amounts to annual disbursements of slightly over $6 billion.
2 NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION RESEARCH APPLIED TO NATIONAL NEEDS, GENERAL
REVENUE SHARING: RESEARCH UTILIZATION PROJECT 1 (1975).
8. The term "net tax burden" or "net state tax burden" will be used throughout
this article to mean that figure arrived at by deducting from the amount of taxes
actually remitted by a taxpayer to a state or local government, the amount of federal
tax savings achieved by deducting such state and local tax payments at the taxpayer's
marginal federal income tax bracket.
9. Every tax expenditure program can be translated into direct expenditure
terms and analyzed as if it were a direct expenditure program. See generally S.
SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973). The analysis in the text views the
deductibility of nonbusiness state and local taxes as a system of indirect revenue
sharing grants from the federal government to state and local governments. However,
the direct expenditure program brought about by the federal deductibility of state
and local taxes can also be analyzed from the vantage point of the aid it gives to
individual taxpayers. Viewed in this manner, the direct assistance program to state
and local taxpayers would appear as follows:
1. If a married couple had more than $200,000 of taxable income, the federal
government would, for each $100 of state and local taxes imposed on the couple,
pay $70 to the state or local government, leaving the couple to pay $30;
2. If a married couple had $10,000 of taxable income, the federal government
would, for each $100 of state and local taxes imposed on the couple, pay $22 to
the state or local government, leaving the couple to pay $78; or,
3. If a married couple were too poor to pay any income tax, the federal
government would pay no part of any tax imposed on the couple by the state
and local government.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
duction for nonbusiness state and local taxes can be seen as a program
of matching grants from the federal government to the state and local
governments distributed on the following terms:
1. If a state or local government imposes a $30 net tax burden
on a person in the 70 percent federal tax bracket, the federal
government pays the state or local government a matching sum
of $70;'o
2. If a state or local government imposes a $30 net tax burden
on a person in the 50 percent federal tax bracket, the federal
government pays the state or local government a matching sum
of $30;11
3. If a state or local government imposes a $30 net tax burden
on a person in the 14 percent federal tax bracket, the federal
government pays the state or local government a matching sum
of approximately $5 ;12
4. If a state or local government imposes a $30 net tax burden
on a person who is either a nontaxpayer for federal income
tax purposes, or who, although a taxpayer, elects the federal
optional standard deduction, the federal government pays
nothing to -the state or local government. 3
No attempt will be made here to discuss the propriety, from a
federal viewpoint, of using the deduction mechanism to provide aid
to state and local governments. 4 Rather, the purpose of this article is
10. To achieve the same result indirectly through the tax system, a state imposes
a $100 tax on the 70 percent bracket taxpayer. The taxpayer initially remits the full
$100 to the state, but is reimbursed for $70 of his cost by a $70 reduction in his
federal income taxes.
11. To achieve the same result indirectly through the tax system, a state imposes
a $60 tax on the 50 percent bracket taxpayer. The taxpayer initially remits the full
$60 to the state, but is reimbursed for $30 of his cost by a $30 reduction in his
federal income taxes.
12. To achieve the same result indirectly through the tax system, a state imposes
a tax of approximately $35 on the 14 percent bracket taxpayer. The taxpayer
initially remits the full $35 to the state, but is reimbursed for approximately $5 of his
cost by a $5 reduction in his federal income taxes.
13. The standard deduction is itself a tax expenditure item. See note 4 supra.
The imposition of an additional state tax burden on the user of a standard deduction,
however, neither increases federal tax expenditures nor decreases the taxpayer's federal
income tax liability (unless the additional state or local tax paid gives the taxpayer
itemized deductions in excess of the maximum standard deduction). Therefore, the
additional $30 tax imposed by a state or local government on a taxpayer electing the
optional standard deduction is paid entirely out of the pocket of that taxpayer, and
the federal government makes no additional contribution to the state or local govern-
ment.
14. There have been numerous proposals offered either to substitute a federal
credit for the current deduction for state and local income taxes, or to buttress the
deduction with such a credit. E.g., W. HELLER, DEDUCTIONS AND CREDITS FOR STATE
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to show how a state, through the use of an income tax with highly
graduated rates, can best take advantage of the open-ended revenue
sharing possibilities inherent in the federal deductibility of state and
local taxes,' 5 while at the same time creating for itself a tax system
INCOME TAXES, TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1 HousE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS,
86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 419 (Comm. Print 1959); ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, II JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. 90TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
REVENUE SHARING AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: WHAT FUTURE FOR FISCAL FEDERALISM
1137-40 (Comm. Print 1967) [hereinafter referred to as 1965 ACIR]; G. BREAK,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 39-45 (1967) ; H.R.
8193, 92ND CONG., 1ST SESS. (1971) and accompanying explanation at 117 CONG. REC.
14197 (1971) (remarks of Representative Byrnes). A federal tax credit for state and
local income taxes (whether enacted as a substitute for, or in addition to the current
deduction) would provide a reduction in federal taxes to taxpayers who now use the
federal optional standard deduction or low-income allowance and who, therefore,
obtain no advantage from the existing personal deduction.
However, if a fixed percentage credit (e.g., 30 percent of the state and local
taxes paid) were substituted for the current deduction for state and local income
taxes, high bracket taxpayers would find their net state tax burden increased. It
would, therefore, be politically more difficult for a state to move to highly graduated
rates. See text accompanying notes 52-54 infra. Moreover, because a fixed credit
would not have the same regressive effct on net state tax burdens as does the present
deduction system (i.e., all taxpayers would have their nominal tax burdens reduced by
the same percentage credit), there would be less need for a highly graduated state
income tax to insure an equitable distribution of the state tax burden. See notes
33-46 and accompanying text infra. Finally, under a fixed credit system, the imposi-
tion of a given amount of state tax on a high bracket taxpayer would bring forth
no greater federal revenue sharing to the state than would the imposition of the
same tax on a lower bracket taxpayer. This effect would also undermine a major
argument in favor of highly graduated state income taxes. See notes 27-32 and
accompanying text infra.
Other commentators have favored eliminating the deduction for all state
taxes, including the income tax, and substituting direct federal subsidies. See, e.g.,
H. BRAZER, THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF STATE AND LOCAL TAXES UNDER THE INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX, 1 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SEss., TAX
REVISION COMPENDIUM 407 (Comm. Print 1959). Professor Brazer criticizes the
federal deductibility of nonbusiness state and local taxes as being inequitable to in-
dividual taxpayers, and irrational and inefficient as a mechanism for providing aid
to state and local governments. "If Federal subsidies are desirable they should be
direct, subject to the scrutiny provided by the operation of the budgetary process, and
specifically tailored to meet the objectives being sought." Id. at 418.
15. Note that the reference in the text is to a state's use of an income tax
with highly graduated rates. This article does not advocate the proliferation of in-
dependent income taxes at local levels. Rather the proposal contained herein for the
use of highly graduated rates is intended to fall within the broader recommendations
of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations that the taxation of
personal income be either by the state or, if also by local governments, "in the form
of a supplement ('piggyback') to be administered with the State tax." 1965 ACIR,
supra note 14, at 1153 (emphasis in original). For an excellent work fully analyzing
both the positive and the negative aspects of local income taxes, see R. SMITH, LOCAL
INCOME TAXES: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND EQUITY (1972). As of 1972 Maryland was
the only state in which local income taxes were levied as supplements to the state
tax. Id. at 14-15.
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which more equitably distributes the tax burden among its citizens
and which is more responsive to economic growth and inflation. The
State of Maryland, whose existing personal income tax structure is
very mildly graduated, will be used as a model.' 6 The discussion,
however, is equally relevant to any state that does not raise a major
portion of its revenue through an income tax with highly graduated
rates.1 7
THE CURRENT MARYLAND PERSONAL INCOME
TAX STRUCTURE
The current Maryland personal income tax structure taxes the
first $1,000 of taxable income at a rate of 2 percent, the second $1,000
at 3 percent, the third $1,000 at 4 percent and all taxable income in
excess of $3,000 at 5 percent.' In addition, Baltimore City and nearly
all of the counties of Maryland impose a local income tax (normally
referred to as the local piggyback tax) at a rate of 50 percent of that
of the state.' 9 Therefore, the combined state and local rates in Mary-
16. For a similar analysis using Massachusetts as a model, see Moscovitch,
State Graduated Income Taxes - A State-Initiated Form of Federal Revenue Shar-
ing, 25 NAT'L TAX J. 53 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MOSCOVlTCH]. Minnesota was
used as a model in W. HELLER, supra note 14.
17. The only states today that have income taxes with highly graduated rate
structures (defined somewhat arbitrarily here as those with maximum marginal rates
of 10 percent or more and with marginal brackets that graduate up to at least $30,000
of taxable income) are: Alaska (14.5 percent on taxable income over $400,000);
Delaware (19.8 percent on taxable income over $100,000) ; Hawaii (11 percent on
taxable income over $30,000) ; Iowa (13 percent on taxable income over $75,000);
Montana (11 percent on taxable income over $35,000) ; Rhode Island (17 percent of
federal income tax liability which is equivalent to 11.9 percent on taxable income
over $200,000) ; Vermont (25 percent of federal income tax liability which is equiva-
lent to 17.5 percent of taxable income over $200,000). Jurisdictions whose highest
marginal rate of tax is ten percent or more but whose highest bracket is under
$30,000 include California (11 percent on taxable income over $15,500) ; Minnesota
(15 percent on taxable income over $20,000) ; New York (15 percent on taxable income
over $25,000) ; North Dakota (10 percent on taxable income over $8,000) ; Oregon
(10 percent on taxable income over $5,000) ; Wisconsin (11.4 percent on taxable
income over $14,000) ; and the District of Columbia (10 percent on taxable income
over $25,000). Colorado's tax is only 8 percent of taxable income over $10,000, but
there is a 2 percent surtax on intangible income over $5,000. New Jersey has no
broad-based income tax of its own, but imposes a tax on New York commuters equal
to the New York income tax. 1 CCH STATE TAX GUIDE 1531-34 (1975). A bill
has recently been introduced in California (S.B. No. 540) (1975) to increase the
marginal rates in its personal income tax to 23 percent on taxable income over
$127,500.
18. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 288(a) (1975).
19. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 283(a) (1975) authorizes each county and Balti-
more City to impose a local income tax upon its residents equal to a percentage (to
a maximum of 50 percent) of such residents' state income tax liability See note 15 supra.
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land graduate from 3 percent on the first $1,000 of taxable income to
7.5 percent on all taxable income in excess of $3,000.20
Maryland adjusted gross income is essentially the same concept as
"adjusted gross income" under the federal income tax.21 To arrive
at Maryland taxable income, taxpayers22 deduct from adjusted gross
income personal and dependency exemptions and either itemized per-
sonal deductions or a standard deduction. Maryland grants a de-
duction of $800 for each personal and dependency exemption, and
allows a standard deduction (which must be used if the optional
standard deduction is elected for federal purposes) of 10 percent of
20. A State Tax Reform Study Committee of the Maryland General Assembly
has recently recommended further graduating the income tax rates so that the highest
marginal tax rate would be 8 percent (12 percent including the 50 percent local
piggyback tax) on all taxable income in excess of $40,000. STATE TAX REFORM STUDY
COMMITTEE, 1975 REPORT OF THE STATE TAX REFORM STUDY COMMITTEE 14-15
[February 1976] [hereinafter cited as 1975 REPORT].
A recent report of the Maryland Commission on the Functions of Government
clearly recognizes Maryland's need for additional revenues and concludes that "such
additional revenue should be generated through a restructured state income tax and/or
the state retail sales tax." II REPORT OF THE MARYLAND COMMISSION ON THE FUNc-
TIONS OF GOVERNMENT 13 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as the SHEREow REPORT].
The Commission recommended that if the personal income tax is to be used to raise
the additional revenues, the tax should be made "meaningfully progressive," id. at 19,
and it set forth five possible new rate schedules for the personal income tax, the
highest of which had marginal rates (including the piggyback tax) graduating up to
18 percent. Id. at 10.
21. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 280 (1975). Adjusted gross income is defined
for federal income tax purposes in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 62. Generally, it means
gross income less the expenses of earning that income. Adjustments to the federal
adjusted gross income for the Maryland tax are found in MD. ANN. CODE art. 81,
§ 280 (1975).
22. Unlike the federal income tax, Maryland's income tax currently has only one
rate schedule in effect for both single and married taxpayers. A Maryland husband
and wife who file jointly for federal tax purposes, however, have the option of filing
either a joint or a separate return in Maryland. The latter is known in Maryland
as a combined-separate return. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 280(d) (1975). The
combined-separate filing status will be advantageous to married taxpayers so long as
each spouse has separate income in excess of $800 (the Maryland personal exemption).
By filing a combined-separate return, each spouse takes advantage of the lower
brackets applicable to his or her first $3,000 of taxable income, and each is entitled to
a separate standard deduction of 10 percent of adjusted gross income up to a maximum
of $500. The State Tax Reform Study Committee has estimated that permitting
married persons to elect the combined-separate filing option results in a loss of state
revenue of approximately $14.5 million annually (a loss of combined state-local
revenue of approximately $21.75 million annually). 1975 REPORT, supra note 20, at 10.
The Committee has recommended the elimination of the combined-separate filing
status. Id. at 21. For simplicity, all computations of Maryland tax in this paper,
whether under the existing or the proposed rates, have been made as if the combined-
separate filing status did not exist. It has been assumed that there is but one rate
schedule applicable to all taxpayers, married or single, and that married taxpayers
must file jointly. See Tables 1-4 infra.
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Maryland adjusted gross income, up to a maximum deduction of
$500.23 Itemized deductions for Maryland purposes are essentially the
same as for federal purposes, except that no deduction for state income
taxes paid is permitted on the Maryland return.24
This paper compares the current Maryland personal income tax
system with a proposed system identical to it in all respects except
that the proposed system substitutes the following highly graduated
rate schedule for the existing one :25
Maryland Taxable
Income
$0 to $999
$1,000 to $1,999
$2,000 to $3,999
$4,000 to $7,999
$8,000 to $11,999
$12,000 to $15,999
$16,000 to $19,999
$20,000 to $23,999
$24,000 to $27,999
$28,000 to $31,999
$32,000 to $39,999
$40,000 to $49,999
$50,000 to $99,999
$100,000 and over
The Combined state and local tax is:
' 1.5 % of the taxable income
$15 plus 3% of excess over $1,000
$45 plus 4.5% of excess over $2,000
$135 plus 6% of excess over $4,000
$375 plus 7.5 % of excess over $8,000
$675 plus 9% of excess over $12,000
$1,035 plus 10.5% of excess over $16,000
$1,455 plus 12% of excess over $20,000
$1,935 plus 13.5% of excess over $24,000
$2,475 plus 15% of excess over $28,000
$3,075 plus 16.5 % of excess over $32,000
$4,395 plus 18% of excess over $40,000
$6,195 plus 19.5 % of excess over $50,000
$15,495 plus 21% of excess over $100,000
There is -nothing sacrosanct about the particular rate schedule
chosen. It was selected because it would have raised virtually the same
amount of revenue for Maryland in 1973 (the last year for which an
accurate statistical breakdown on individual income tax returns filed
in Maryland was available) that the existing personal income tax
actually raised in that year.26
23. The Maryland personal income tax has no provision that is equivalent to
the federal low income allowance, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 141(c). The Maryland
Tax Reform Study Committee has recommended that Maryland's percentage standard
deduction be increased to 10 percent of adjusted gross income up to a maximum
deduction of $1,500, with a minimum deduction of $500. 1975 REPORT, supra note 20,
at 16-17.
24. There are other minor differences between allowable federal and allowable
Maryland itemized deductions. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 281 (1975).
25. The proposed rate. schedule would be applicable to all single and married
Maryland taxpayers. See note 22 supra.
26. See Table 1, Columns 2 and 6 infra.
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GRADUATED RATES AND STATE-INITIATED REVENUE SHARING 7 OR
HOW TO REDUCE TAXES WITHOUT REDUCING REVENUES
The first advantage of highly graduated state income tax rates is
that such rates enable a state to shift a substantial part of the burden
of financing state governmental operations from state taxpayers onto the
federal government. The mechanics by which this shift of burdens
takes place is best illustrated by assuming a situation in which a state
wants to keep its revenue constant, but desires to shift tax burdens
from low to higher income taxpayers in order to make its tax system
more equitable. To accomplish this result, the state decides to amend its
personal income tax in a manner that would decrease the tax revenue
collected from taxpayers electing the standard deduction (for federal
and state purposes) by a total of $100X (e.g., by increasing the allow-
able standard deduction), but would increase the tax revenue collected
from taxpayers in the federal 70 percent tax bracket by the same $100X
(e.g., by increasing the marginal state rates at that income level).2
The results of this shift in tax burdens for the state, state taxpayers,
and the federal government are as follows:
1. The state's revenue from its personal income tax remains the
same. The $100X that the state previously collected from the
taxpayers using the standard deduction is now collected from
the 70 percent bracket taxpayers.
2. The taxpayers using the standard deduction are relieved of a
net state tax burden in the amount of $100X.
3. The 70 percent bracket taxpayers have their net state tax
burden increased by $30X (i.e., the $100X paid to the state
less the $70X saved by the federal deduction).
4. The federal government, in effect, makes an additional con-
tribution to the state treasury of $70X (i.e., the $70X value of
the federal deduction to the 70 percent bracket taxpayers).
The state is, thus, receiving $70X from the federal government
that it formerly collected from state taxpayers. It is this ability of a
state, by its own fiscal policies, to bring about additional federal grants,
and thus shift tax burdens from state taxpayers onto the federal
27. This term was first used by MOSCOVTCH, supra note 15.
28. It is not being suggested here that an increased standard deduction could
realistically be funded by increasing taxes on the few state taxpayers in the highest
70 percent federal tax bracket. Rather, the shift in tax burdens from users of the
standard deduction to 70 percent bracket taxpayers is being assumed in order to
simply illustrate the concept referred to herein as "state-initiated revenue sharing."
19761
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government, which has been referred to as "state-initiated revenue
sharing." 9 It is a politician's dream: reduced taxes without reduced
revenues - that is, a reduction of the total tax burden borne by the
taxpayers of the state, without a reduction in the revenue received by
the state.
Table 1 illustrates. "state-initiated revenue sharing" on a larger
scale. It shows the additional federal grants that Maryland could have
initiated had it shifted,. in 1973, from its existing rate schedule to the
proposed highly graduated one. While both rate schedules would have
raised virtually the same revenue for Maryland in 1973,83 the proposed
highly graduated rate schedule would have done so at a significantly
lower cost to Maryland taxpayers. More specifically, Maryland tax-
payers with adjusted gross income (AGI) under $30,000 would, as a
class, have been relieved of a net state tax burden of approximately
$100 million.81 $50 million of that burden would have been shifted to
Maryland taxpayers with AGI above $30,000, while the remaining $50
29. Moscovitch explained "state-initiated revenue sharing" in the following terms:
[A] graduated tax allows the state to shift a large part of the tax burden onto
the Federal Government. Since all major state and local taxes are deductible for
Federal income-tax purposes, the Federal Government in effect bears part of the
burden of state taxes. By shifting state taxes onto those taxpayers in the highest
Federal tax brackets, the adoption of graduated rates increases the total amount
of Federal tax savings, and thereby reduces the total burden of a state income-tax.
In effect, adoption of graduated rates offers an opportunity for the state to par-
ticipate in a form of state-initiated revenue-sharing.
MOSCOVITCH, supra note 16, at 53.
30. In the calendar year 1973, Maryland actually recorded revenue from the
state tax of $532,288,403 and from the local tax of $265,232,224, for a total of
$797,520,627. STATE OF MARYLAND, COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, INCOME TAX
DIVISION, SUMMARY REPORT, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FILED FOR THE YEAR
1973, at 9 (1975). The difference between that figure and the $822,372,000 shown in
Table 1 is explained mainly by the fact that the latter figure was computed on the
assumption that married taxpayers could not file a combined-separate return. See
note 22 supra. In addition, the revenue figure in Table 1, unlike the actual revenue
figure, is not reduced for foreign state and personal property tax credits. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 81, §§ 290 (Supp. 1975) & 291 (1975).
31. Table 1 adopts the adjusted gross income classifications used by the Mary-
land Income Tax Division in its annual report on individual income tax returns.
STATE OF MARYLAND, COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, INCOME TAX DmSION, SUM-
MARY REPORT, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FILED FOR THE YEAR 1973 (1975).
While taxpayers with AGI between $20,000 and $30,000 will, as a class, find their
state tax burdens decreased under the proposed rates, many taxpayers within that
class will find their taxes increased. A taxpayer with taxable income of $18,500
will pay the same state tax under either the proposed or the existing rate schedule.
Consequently, in terms of AGI, the breakeven point for a family of four with
itemized deductions (other than the state and local income tax) equal to 16 percent
of AGI is approximately $26,000. The breakeven point for a family of four (in which
only one spouse has income) that elects the optional standard deduction is $22,000.
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million would have been effectively shifted from Maryland taxpayers
onto the federal government 2 (Table 1, Column 7 minus Column 3).
EQUITY OF HIGHLY GRADUATED RATES IN STATE INCOME TAXES
Just as it is the federal deductibility of state and local taxes that
makes possible the state-initiated revenue sharing described above, so
too is it the federal deductibility that makes the use of highly graduated
rates in state income taxes essential from an equity viewpoint. Tradi-
tionally, taxes or tax systems 'have been classified as progressive, pro-
portional or regressive depending on whether they take from high-
income persons a larger percentage of their income, the same percentage
of their income, or a smaller percentage of their income than they take
from low-income persons.33 However, before these three classifications
can be used to describe accurately the true impact of state and local
taxes, they must be redefined to mean progressive, proportional or
regressive after taking into account the federal deductibility of the
state and local taxes. Using that definition, state and local taxes which
are regressive on their face34 become more regressive in their actual
32. In Table 1, the amount of state tax estimated to be offset by deductibility
under the federal tax was computed without taking into account the possible effects
of the federal 50 percent maximum rate on earned income. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 1348. In fact, the effects of section 1348 would be minimal. If, for example,
one-third of the state tax deducted by taxpayers with AGI above $50,000 were
deducted from a federal marginal 50 percent bracket - rather than the higher brackets
indicated in Table 1 - the results would be as follows:
(1) Under existing rates, the state taxes offset by federal deductibility would
decrease from $174,582 to $172,604; and,
(2) Under the proposed rates, the state taxes offset by federal deductibility
would decrease from $222,267 to $218,271.
The assumption that one-third of the state tax deducted by taxpayers with AGI above
$50,000 would be deducted against the maximum 50 percent federal bracket probably
overstates the actual impact of section 1348. See Appendix infra.
33. While academicians continue their never-ending debate about the theoretical
justification for progressive taxes, politicians and the general public have long accepted
them, at least in principal, as more equitable than taxes that are either proportional
or regressive. The classic work on the subject is W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, JR., THE
UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953) ; see also C. GALVIN & B. BITTKER,
THE INCOME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE SHOULD IT BE? (1969).
34. Because low income people spend a greater fraction of their income than do
high income persons, a tax on consumer purchases is on its face inherently regressive.
While exemption of food makes the sales tax basically proportional, such an exemption
results in a substantial loss of revenue. A number of states have, therefore, enacted
legislation to permit sales tax credits against the income tax in order to lessen the
regressivity without significantly reducing revenue. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL FINANCES: SIGNIFICANT FEATURES
OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 3 (1973-74 ed. 1974) [hereinafter referred to as 1973-74
ACIRI. For a description of state and local sales taxes now in effect see id. at
238-51.
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impact; state and local taxes which are proportional on their face
become effectively regressive in their impact; and state and local taxes
which are mildly progressive on their face become effectively propor-
tional and regressive over a wide range of income. It is only the
state income tax with rates highly graduated over a wide range of
income that avoids having its upper income end relentlessly bent into
regressive form by the effects of federal deductibility.3 5
Consider, for example, the impact on state taxpayers of a state
income tax which imposes a flat rate of 5 percent of AGI, and makes
no allowance for personal exemptions or personal deductions. In ap-
pearance, that tax imposes a proportional 5 percent burden on the
income of all state taxpayers. That appearance, however, is entirely
deceptive. In fact, it is only the state taxpayer who elects the federal
optional standard deduction or low-income allowance who actually
bears the full nominal 5 percent rate. All others (i.e., itemizers)
receive federal help in paying their state tax, and the amount of
federal help they receive increases as their federal marginal income
tax bracket increases. That is, of course, the way it is with all de-
ductions. A $100 deduction saves a 70 percent bracket taxpayer $70,
a 50 percent bracket taxpayer $50, and a 14 percent bracket taxpayer
only $14. So, for example, the taxpayer in the 50 percent marginal
federal tax bracket will initially remit the full 5 percent tax to the
state, but he will then deduct that state tax paid on his federal income
tax return, and thus be reimbursed by the federal government for
50 percent of the state tax. The state taxpayer will effectively bear only
a 2.5 percent tax himself.
After federal deductibility, then, the nominal 5 percent propor-
tional tax is actually borne by state taxpayers in the following manner:
1. 5 percent by taxpayers using the standard deduction;
2. 4.3 percent by itemizers in the 14 percent federal marginal tax
bracket;
3. 3.4 percent by itemizers in the 32 percent federal marginal tax
bracket;
4. 2.5 percent by itemizers in the 50 percent federal marginal tax
bracket; and
35. See W. HELLER, supra note 14, at 422. Three states (Nebraska, Rhode Island,
and Vermont) insure effective progressivity throughout the income scale by making
their state income taxes a flat percentage of a taxpayer's federal income tax liability.
From an administrative viewpoint this approach is the simplest for both the taxpayer
and the tax administering agency. Most states, however, have been unwilling to
effectively relinquish control of their income tax systems to the federal government
in this way. For an analysis of the "percent of federal tax" approach see MoscovITCH,
supra note 16, at 60-64.
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5. 1.5 percent by itemizers in the 70 percent federal marginal tax
bracket.
What on its face appeared to be a proportional tax is actually borne by
state taxpayers in an entirely regressive fashion, with the richest paying
1.5 percent of their income, and the poorest paying 5 percent.
Unlike the tax just considered, the Maryland personal income
tax is not on its face, proportional; rather, it his rates (including
the local piggyback tax) which graduate from 3 percent on the first
$1,000 of taxable income to 7.5 percent on all taxable income over
$3,000. Maryland's income tax, therefore, appears mildly progressive
at all income levels; but again the appearance is deceptive. Part I of
Table 2 illustrates the actual (after federal deductibility) impact of the
existing Maryland personal income tax on a hypothetical family of
four at various income levels. Each family is assumed (for both state
and federal income tax purposes) to have itemized deductions (not
including the state income tax paid) equal to 16 percent of AGI.36
Table 2 (Part I, Column 6) indicates that, despite the regressive
effect federal deductibility has on net state tax burdens, the current
Maryland personal income tax remains very slightly progressive for
itemizing taxpayers up to $25,000 of AGI. At that level of income,
the average itemizing family of four is bearing a net state tax burden
equal to 3.6 percent of its AGI; however, federal deductibility there-
after bends the state tax into entirely regressive form. For example,
the family with $50,000 of AGI bears a net state tax burden of 3.1
percent of its AGI, the family with $100,000 a net state tax burden of
2.5 percent of its AGI, and the family with $500,000 a net state tax
burden equal to a miniscule 1.9 percent of its AGI.3"
By reducing the tax burden on itemizing families with AGI
of $25,000 and below, and increasing the burden on families with AGI
above that level, 38 the proposed rate schedule makes the Maryland per-
sonal income tax effectively (after federal deductibility) progressive for
itemizing families of four up to an AGI level of $100,000 (Table 2,
36. Table 2 assumes that the federal 50 percent maximum rate on earned income,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1348, is not applicable to the hypothetical taxpayers. To
the extent that the 50 percent maximum rate on earned income applies to the taxpayer
with $100,000, $200,000 or $500,000 of AGI, that taxpayer's effective (i.e., after federal
deductibility) state tax burden will increase somewhat, because he will then be de-
ducting part of his state tax from a 50 percent marginal tax bracket rather than the
higher marginal tax bracket set forth in the applicable federal rate schedule. See
Appendix infra.
37. See note 36 supra.
38. The actual breakeven point for a family of four with itemized deductions
(other than the state and local income tax) equal to 16 percent of AGI is approximately
$26,000. See note 31 supra.
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Part II, Column 6). Between $100,000 and $200,000 of AGI the
net state tax burden again dips slightly: at the level of income, the
nominal state rates have stopped graduating while the federal rates
continue to graduate. 9
In terms of equity, however, things are really worse in Maryland
than Table 2 indicates. Table 2 deals only with taxpayers who itemize
their personal deductions, and tells nothing of the plight of the majority
of low- and middle-income taxpayers who elect either the federal op-
tional percentage standard deduction or low-income allowance." These
taxpayers are doubly disadvantaged in Maryland: first, they receive no
federal help in paying their state tax; and second, they are entitled to
no low-income allowance, and a percentage standard deduction of only
10 percent of AGI up to a maximum deduction of $500."' The com-
bination of these effects leads to dramatic and perverse differences
between the tax burdens borne in Maryland by high-income itemizers
and those borne by low- and middle-income taxpayers electing the
optional percentage standard deduction or low income allowance.
Column 3 of Table 3 (Part I) reveals, for example, that under the
existing Maryland personal income tax, a family of four with $20,000
of adjusted gross income that elects the federal optional standard
deduction bears an effective state tax burden (5.7 percent) that is
3 times that borne by a family with $500,000 of adjusted gross income
(1.9 percent). 42 The family with $15,000 of adjusted gross income
that elects the federal optional standard deduction bears an effective
state tax burden (5.1 percent) that is 2.7 times as great as that borne
by the $500,000 income family.4" The proposed rates, while reducing
taxes on all low- and middle-income taxpayers, still leave taxpayers
using the optional standard deduction or low income allowance in a most
disadvantaged position (see Table 3, Part II, Columns 2 and 3)."
39. For the possible effects of the 50 percent federal maximum rate on earned
income, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1348, on the overall progressivity of the existing
and proposed Maryland personal income tax see Appendix infra.
40. For 1975, the federal optional standard deduction is an amount equal to sixteen
percent of an individual taxpayer's adjusted gross income. The maximum deduction
amounts are $2,300 for a single taxpayer, $2,600 for a married taxpayer filing jointly,
and $1,300 for a married taxpayer filing separately. The federal low income allow-
ance during 1975 is $1,600 for a single taxpayer, $1,900 for a married taxpayer
filing jointly, and $950 for a married taxpayer filing separately.
41. See note 23 supra.
42. See note 36 supra.
43. Id.
44. As noted in the text, the high state tax burden borne by Maryland taxpayers
who use the standard deduction is attributable both to their inability to subtract state
income taxes paid in computing their federal income tax and to the very low standard
deduction allowed in Maryland. To alleviate this discrimination, Maryland might
consider the adoption of a highly graduated rate schedule which, by increasing the
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From the perspective of equity, the case for highly graduated
rates is, thus, quite formidable. The adoption by Maryland of the
proposed rate schedule will provide significant tax relief to most low-
and middle-income state taxpayers, without unduly burdening the
state's more wealthy. The nominally very high marginal rates that the
proposed rate schedule imposes on the state's high-income taxpayers
will, in the end, be borne in large part by the federal government.4 5
Part II of Table 2 indicates that under the highly graduated proposed
rates, no Maryland taxpayer would bear a net state tax burden (after
federal deductibility) much higher than 5 percent of his AGI.46
ECONOMIC RESPONSIVENESS OF HIGHLY GRADUATED RATES
State and local governments are faced today with an ever in-
creasing need for tax revenue.4 7 If this need is to be met without
tax rates for itemizing Maryland taxpayers with AGI below $25,000, gives less relief
than does the proposed rate schedule to taxpayers in those brackets, (see Table 3
supra), but which, by increasing the optional standard deduction and introducing a
low income allowance, directs more relief to low and middle income taxpayers who
do not itemize their personal deductions. See note 23 supra. For purposes of clarity
in illustrating the effects of a highly graduated state tax rate, this article assumes
no change was made in the allowable Maryland standard deduction.
45. With marginal federal tax brackets that graduate up to 70 percent on
unearned income, and state rates that graduate up to 21 percent, it might appear that
a high bracket taxpayer's last dollar of income is being taxed at an almost confisca-
tory combined federal-state rate. But, of course, the combined federal-state rate
is not nearly as high as it would first appear. When a 21 percent marginal state
rate is added to a 70 percent marginal federal rate, the combined marginal rate is
76.3 percent and not 91 percent. The 21 percent state tax is deducted from the federal
marginal 70 percent tax bracket, resulting in a net tax increase caused by the state
tax of only 6.3 percent.
46. To the extent that the federal maximum 50 percent rate on earned income,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1348, applies to a high bracket taxpayer, his net state tax
burden would rise above 5 percent, see Appendix infra. His net combined federal-state
tax, however, will decrease.
47. The future needs of the State of Maryland for additional revenue were dis-
cussed in the SHEROW REPORT:
Even in times of economic stability and growth, the financing of governmental
operations through the existing system of taxation in Maryland has been criticized
by the tax paying public. Inflation and the increasing complexity of economic,
social, environmental, energy, and other problems will cause the costs of govern-
ment in the years ahead to increase. To provide essentially the same service
today at levels comparable to a year ago requires a higher cash outlay; in a
period of moderate economic growth, the increase in the tax base fills this gap,
but a recession in the midst of inflation dictates either a reduction in services or
an increase in tax rates or new sources of revenues.
SHERBOW REPORT, supra note 20, at 5.
While major increases in direct federal grants to the state and local govern-
ments might provide the needed additional revenue, there is no current expectation
that any such increases will be forthcoming. In fact, there are even indications that
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frequent increases in tax rates, a state must create a tax source which
is capable of keeping up with economic growth and inflation. Only the
highly graduated state income tax will adequately serve this function.4
It does this because,
As personal income in a state rises, the average family moves to a
higher income-tax bracket. Under a graduated tax, the per cent
of its income a family pays in taxes also rises. With a given in-
crease in personal income in a state, then, a graduated income
tax will produce a bigger revenue increase than a flat tax. Thus,
a state could meet its fiscal needs ... with less frequent increases
in -tax rates.49
The economic responsiveness of highly graduated rates is illustrated
by Table 4. While the proposed highly graduated rates would have
produced virtually the same revenue in 1973 as did the existing rates,
Table 4 estimates that, by 1977, the proposed rates would be out-
producing the existing rates by more than $120 million (Column 6
minus Column 2)," and because of the effects of federal deductibility,
the additional $120 million of state revenue would be paid for almost
entirely by the federal government (Column 7 minus Column 3).51 This
President Ford's proposal to extend the direct revenue sharing program (see note 3
supra) beyond its 1976 expiration date may be iR trouble. Washington Post, Dec. 2,
1975, § A, at 2, col. 3. A recent study of the 1972 direct revenue sharing program
indicates that without such increased federal grants, state and local governments will
experience rapidly expanding revenue expenditure gaps during the remainder of the
1970's even "if prices continue to rise at even moderate rates." D. GREYTAK & B. JUMP,
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION ON THE EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES OF SIX LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS, 1971-1979, 2 GENERAL REVENUE SHARING-REsEARcH UTILIZATION
PROJECT 49, 55 (1975).
48. In 1965, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations con-
cluded that:
The overriding fiscal need of State governments (including their local govern-
ments) is more tax revenue, particularly a tax source with a strong revenue
growth potential in a growing economy. This immediately focuses attention on
the personal income tax because, in a majority of the States, it is either the least
effectively used major tax source or not used at all, and because it responds to
economic growth more than any other tax.
1965 ACIR, supra note 14, at 1127. Almost ten years later the same group again
recommended that "[t]he personal income tax should stand out as the single most
important revenue instrument in the State tax system," specifically noting the im-
portance of the use of graduated rates in increasing "the responsiveness of income
tax collections to economic growth." 1973-74 ACIR, supra note 34, at 1, 3.
49. MoscoVcsI, supra note 16, at 54.
50. The 1977 figures were estimated by computing the annual percentage in-
crease/decrease in the number of Maryland taxpayers in each adjusted gross income
class between 1971 and 1973, and assuming the same percentage changes continued
annually from 1973-77.
51. In Table 4, as in Table 1, the amount of state tax estimated to be offset by
deductibility under the federal tax was computed without taking into account the
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revenue gap between the proposed and existing rates would, of course,
widen in each succeeding year.
The same additional $120 million revenue would, of course, be
produced for the state in 1977 by the proposed rates were those rates
first instituted in 1977, rather than in 1973 as hypothesized. There
are political advantages, however, in the earlier move to highly gradu-
ated rates. In the present economy where high inflation steadily pushes
up average personal incomes, .the longer a state holds off adopting
highly graduated rates, the more difficult doing so becomes politically.
Each year more and more persons move into higher tax brackets and
are therefore adversely affected by the same shift to a given graduated
rate schedule.52 For example, in 1973, only about 7.5 percent of all
Maryland taxpayers would have had their state taxes increased by
the introduction of the proposed highly graduated rates.5 3 By 1977,
however, it is estimated that approximately 16.5 percent of all Mary-
land taxpayers would find their state taxes increased by the introduction
of these same rates.5
PROBLEM OF INTERSTATE TAX COMPETITION
Given the striking advantages of a state's use of an income tax
with highly graduated rates, it is difficult to understand why so few states
today have such a tax. The answer presumably lies in the traditional
fear among state and local politicians and voters of interstate tax
competition. 5 They believe, whether justifiably or not, that interstate
possible effects of the federal 50 percent maximum rate on earned income. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 1348. See note 32 supra. If, for example, one-third of the state tax
deducted by taxpayers with AGI above $50,000 were deducted from a federal marginal
50 percent bracket rather than the higher brackets indicated in Table 4, the results
would be as follows: (1) Under existing rates, the state taxes offset by federal
deductibility would decrease from $373,626 to $369,881; (2) Under the proposed rates,
the state taxes offset by federal deductibility would decrease from $486,452 to
$478,208. See Appendix infra.
52. Of course, it may be argued that responding to inflation by graduating rates
is unfair to taxpayers because, while inflation may bring about an increase in a tax-
payer's nominal taxable income, it does not increase his ability to pay. Therefore, if
higher rates are applied to the nominally higher taxable income, it will bring about
an increased real tax burden on a fixed real income. For a response to this argument,
see Beer & Walther, Inflation and the Progressivity of the Federal Individual Income
Tax, 10 CALIF. W.L. REV. 537 (1974).
53. It was assumed that 29 percent of Maryland taxpayers in the AGI classifica-
tion of $20-$30,000 had AGI above $25,000 and 71 percent had AGI below $25,000.
This division was based on average U.S. figures. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
STATISTICS OF INCOME - 1972 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 9, Table 1.2 (1973).
54. See notes 50 and 53 supra.
55. For general discussions of the problem of interstate tax competition, see
0. OLDMAN & F. SCHOETTLE, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES AND FINANCE, TEXT, PROBLEMS
AND CASES 100-04 (1974), ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
19761
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tax differentials significantly affect taxpayers' decisions regarding place
of residence and place of work. This fear is particularly great when the
tax being considered is the highly visible state income tax. It has been
alleged, for example, that personal income tax rate differentials for
salary income not only discourage citizens from locating in a high
income tax state, but also discourage business firms from doing the
same "because of the difficulty of attracting executive talent to such
States.""6
Available evidence, while inconclusive, tends to indicate that
interstate personal tax differentials play but a minor role in the deci-
sions of citizens and businesses regarding residence and business loca-
tion.57 Nevertheless, this factor cannot be ignored by those attempting
to influence legislative decisions in the tax field:
[W]hether or not empirical studies can isolate tax influences on
location, policy makers clearly fear the potential effects, and these
effects are therefore a real factor in tax policy at the state and
local level, even if their fear is not justified by the evidence ...
It is of little use for students of public finance to dismiss this as
nonrational behavior.58
Not only should students of public finance not ignore the fear that
policy makers have of interstate tax competition, but they should
affirmatively attempt to mitigate that fear.
First of all, potential reformers should explain to the policy makers
that the federal deductibility of state and local taxes has a greatly
moderating effect on interstate tax differentials. 9 For if tax differen-
tials do, in fact, affect any groups' decisions as to residence, it is
probably only the decisions of high-income taxpayers, and they are the
ones for whom the moderating effect of federal deductibility is most
significant. Moreover, they are also the ones most likely to be aware
of this moderating effect. The moderating effect of federal deducti-
bility on interstate tax differentials can be observed by comparing
the net state income tax burden under existing law of a family of four
STATE-LOCAL TAXATION AND INDUSTRIAL LOCATION (1967); Bridges, Jr., Deductibility
of State and Local Nonbusiness Taxes Under the Federal Individual Income Tax,
19 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 9-14 (1966) [hereinafter cited as BRIDGES]; J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL
TAX POLICY 219-24 (rev. ed. 1971) and W. HELLER, supra note 14, at 424-25.
56. BRIDGES, supra note 55, at 10 n.18.
57. One study suggests that even high income individuals are almost totally insen-
sitive to local tax differentials. R. BARLoW, H. BRAzER & J. MORGAN, ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR OF THE AFFLUENT 169-70 (1966). See also OLDMAN & SCHOETTLE, supra
note 55; and BRIDGES, supra note 55.
58. D. NETZER, State-Local Finance and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations
(1969), in 0. OLDMAN & F. SCHOETTLE, supra note 55, at 104.
59. For a discussion of the effects of the federal deductibility of state and local
taxes on interstate tax differentials, see BRIDGES, supra note 55.
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with $100,000 of AGI with that of a similarly situated family under
the proposed highly graduated rates.6" While the taxes actually re-
mitted by the family to the state will increase under the proposed
rates by $6,231 (from $5,970 to $12,201), an increase of 6.2 percent
of AGI, the family's net state tax burden (after federal deductibility)
will increase by only $2,803 (from $2,537 to $5,340), an increase of
only 2.8 percent of AGI (see Table 2). Secondly, potential reformers
should emphasize to policy makers that, even if the imposition of high
state income tax rates does lead to the exodus of some individuals
(or even businesses) from their state, the revenues lost by such
exodus will be easily recouped by the higher additional revenues raised
by the higher rates.
Finally, state policy makers should not be allowed to lose sight of
the consistent trend throughout the nation toward higher rates in state
income taxes. The continuation of this trend - and there is no reason
to believe that the trend will not continue - will inevitably result in their
being no low-tax jurisdictions to which a high-income taxpayer can flee.
Since 1967, income taxes have been introduced into five states6 ' that pre-
viously had no income tax (leaving only ten states without broad-based
personal income taxes),62 and rates have been increased at least once
in twenty-one other state income taxes.6 3 During 1975 alone there
were across-the-board rate increases in state income taxes in four
states, 64 and moves in two others toward the imposition of new broad-
based income taxes. 65 Today, the highest marginal tax bracket equals or
exceeds 10 percent in fourteen states.66 By comparison, in 1967, there
were but seven states imposing taxes with marginal rates that high.'
60. Since Maryland's neighboring state of Virginia has income tax rates similar
to those now existing in Maryland, [VA. CODE ANN. § 58-151.011 (1974)] this com-
parison will approximate the interstate tax differentials that would exist between
Maryland and Virginia were Maryland to adopt the highly graduated proposed rates.
61. Illinois, Maine, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island.
62. Connecticut, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Washington and Wyoming. New Hampshire, Tennessee. New
Jersey (as of 1975), and Connecticut tax capital gains and dividends. New Jersey
also has a broad-based income tax applicable only to New York residents working in
New Jersey. During 1975, efforts were made in New Jersey and South Dakota to
initiate a broad-based income tax, but the efforts failed.
63. These figures were compiled by the author from CCH State Tax Guide,
1531-34 and Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Tax Overlapping
in the United States Selected Tables Updated, A Supplement to Report M-23, 23-31,
Table 53 (1967).
64. Michigan, Nebraska, Rhode Island and Utah.
65. New Jersey and South Dakota. The efforts failed.
66. See note 17 supra.
67. Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, and
Wisconsin.
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Maryland's neighboring State of Delaware, for example, currently
imposes an income tax with rates graduating as high as 19.8 percent."5
The current maximum rates in the income taxes of neighboring Virginia
and the District of Columbia are 5.75 percent6 9 and 10 percent, ° respec-
tively and likely to move higher soon." The same forces that are pushing
Maryland toward the use of a more highly graduated income tax
(i.e., its growing need for more tax revenue and particularly a tax
source with a strong revenue growth potential, as well as the demands
of its citizenry for a more equitable state and local tax system) will
presumably also force its neighboring states to follow suit.
SUMMARY
The case for highly graduated rates in state income taxes may be
summarized as follows: (1) The highly graduated state income tax
most effectively takes advantage of the indirect program of federal
revenue sharing resulting from the deductibility of state and local taxes
for federal income tax purposes; (2) It is only the highly graduated
state income tax which imposes a greater net state tax burden on high-
income taxpayers than on low-income taxpayers; and, (3) It is only the
highly graduated state income tax which, because of its greater re-
sponsiveness to changes in personal income, is capable of financing the
rapidly increasing cost of state and local governmental operations.
Just as the states' needs for additional revenue overcame the historical
opposition to the very use by states of income taxes,72 their current
needs for expanding revenue sources are beginning to erode opposition
to highly graduated state income tax rates. As more states move toward
the adoption of highly graduated state income tax rates, fears of inter-
state tax competition (already greatly mitigated by the effects of
federal deductibility) will be effectively laid to rest.
68. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1102 (1974).
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-151.011 (1974).
70. D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1567b(a) (1973).
71. According to a recent editorial in the Washington Post:
[T]he fiscal news emanating from Richmond is not good. In fact, each time Gov.
Mills E. Godwin discusses the state's financial shape, it is worse. ...
Certainly it has been difficult for all governments to anticipate the pressures
of the economy on their budgets and programs .... [This pressure] will require
a recognition by Gov. Godwin and the General Assembly that the answer cannot
be merely to reduce services. . . . New sources of revenue must be proposed,
lobbied for and approved.
Washington Post, Dec. 4, 1975, § A, at 18, col. 1 (emphasis added). There are also
indications that the District of Columbia is considering a 4 to 5 percent increase in
its personal income tax (which now has a maximum marginal rate of 10 percent).
Washington Post, Jan. 7, 1976, § D, at 1, col 1.
72. J. PECHMAN, supra note 55, at 221.
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APPENDIX
The body of this article ignored the possible effects on the net (i.e.,
after federal deductibility) state tax burden of high-income taxpayers
caused by the federal 50 percent maximum rate on earned income.73 This
Appendix is designed to illustrate those effects, and to demonstrate that
they do not significantly detract from the equitable arguments 74 set forth
herein in favor of highly graduated state income taxes. 75 The federal
maximum tax on earned income is:
in effect, an alternative tax computation for earned income under
which earned income in taxable income brackets where the tax rate
73. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1348. In 1969, "Congress concluded that extremely
high rates of tax, particularly in the case of earned income, are unrealistic and tend
to create distortions in our tax system." JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVEN UE,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 224 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as GENERAL EXPLANATION]. Congress therefore enacted a 50 percent maximum
marginal rate on earned income to help reduce the "disincentive effect of high tax
rates in the case of earned income." Id. at 224. For purposes of section 1348:
Earned income generally includes wages, salaries, professional fees or com-
pensation for personal services, including royalty payments to authors and in-
ventors and, in the case of a taxpayer engaged in a trade or business where both
personal services and capital are a material income-producing factor, a reasonable
amount but not more than 30 percent of his share of the net profits of the business.
Id. at 226.
In 1972, 88,000 tax returns filed in the United States reported income subject
to the 50 percent maximum rate on earned income. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
STATISTICS OF INCOME - 1972 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 145, Table 3A (1973).
These 88,000 returns were divided among taxpayers in the following AGI classes:
Number of tax returns in Percentage of tax returns
AGI class reporting in- in AGI class reporting in-
come subject to 50 per- come subject to 50 per-
AGI Class cent maximum rate cent maximum rate
$ 50,000-$100,000 46,000 9.5%
$100,000-$200,000 35,000 38.0%
$200,000-$500,000 6,000 31.2%
Over $500,000 1,000 27.0%
88,000
Id. at 6 and 145, Table 1.1 and Table 3A (1973).
74. See notes 33-46 and accompanying text supra.
75. The possible effects of the maximum tax on earned income on state initiated
revenue sharing was considered in notes 32 and 51 supra and were found to be
minimal. The maximum tax rate, of course, has no effect on the economic responsive-
ness argument advanced in favor of a highly graduated state tax system. See notes
47-54 and accompanying text supra.
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would otherwise be greater than 50 percent is subject to a flat 50
percent rate.76
Because the net state tax burden borne by a taxpayer depends on the
federal tax bracket or brackets from which he deducts his state taxes, the
relationship between the federal maximum 50 percent tax rate on earned
income and a taxpayer's net state tax burden is obvious. To the extent
that the application of the maximum tax on earned income results in a
taxpayer's deducting his state and local taxes at a 50 percent, rather than,
e.g., a 60 or 70 percent marginal federal tax bracket, his net (i.e., after
federal deductibility) state tax burden will increase.
The following two examples (the first a situation in which all of the
taxpayer's AGI is earned income, and the second a situation in which only
part of the taxpayer AGI is earned income) illustrate the mechanics of
computing the federal tax under the 50 percent maximum rate on earned
income, and the effect of this computation on the net state tax burden of
high income taxpayers.
Example I
A Maryland family of four has $100,000 of adjusted gross income,
all consisting of earned net income.77 Personal deductions (other than
76. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 73, at 225. The mechanics by which this
alternative tax operates is further explained by Professor Chommie as follows:
The application of the 50% maximum rate requires that earned income be
first reduced to "earned net income" (the deduction of the section 62 adjusted
gross income deductions allocable to the earned income), and then to "earned
taxable income." The determination of the latter can be expressed in terms of a
formula which is designed to reduce the benefits of section 1348 when the taxpayer
has untaxed preference income in excess of $30,000 and to take into account the
taxpayer's non-earned income. This is the formula:
A = Earned net income
B = Adjusted Gross Income
C = Taxable Income
D = Total preference Income
Earned taxable income [A/B x C] - [D - $30,000]
Once earned income is determined, section 1348(a) prescribes a three-step process
for the determination of tax liabiltiy. The first step requires a computation of the
amount of taxable income at or below the 50% bracket ($52,000 on a joint return;
$38,000 for heads of households and unmarried individuals). The second step con-
sists of multiplying the amount of earned income which exceeds the taxable income
in the first step by the maximum 50% rate. The third and final step requires the
determination of the tax on the balance of taxable income by computing total tax
liability without section 1348 and subtracting the tax on earned taxable income
without using section 1348. The sum of the three steps constitutes total tax liability.
The foregoing process, it should be noted, subjects the top amounts of un-
earned income to tax at the marginal rate which would be applicable if section 1348
did not apply.
J. CHOMmIE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 39 (2d ed. 1973).
77. "Earned income" is defined in note 73 supra, and "earned net income" is
defined in note 76 so pra. It is assumed in this example that the taxpayer does not
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the deduction for state and local income taxes paid) equal $16,000. The
existing rate schedule is in effect in Maryland, so that the family owes
state and local income taxes to Maryland of $5,970.78
A. Section 1348 is Inapplicable
If Section 1348 were not in the Internal Revenue Code, the family's
federal income tax liability and net state income tax burden would be
computed as follows:
1. Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) ------... $100,000
2. Exemptions 3,000
3. Personal deductions (other than for state and local
income taxes paid)-- 16,000
4. Taxable income (without deduction for state and
local income taxes paid) 81,000
5. Federal tax if no state or local income taxes paid - 33,920
6. Federal tax bracket(s) from which $5,970 of state
and local income taxes are deducted 58 & 55%
7. Actual federal tax paid (i.e. based on $75,030 of
taxable incom e) -------------------------. ....- -- 30,487
8. Reduction in federal tax caused by deduction for
state and local income taxes (line 5 less line 7)------ 3,433
9. Net state tax burden ($5,970 [state arid local tax
paid] less $3,433) - - - - 2,537
10. Net state tax burden as percentage of AGI (line
9 divided by line 1) ---------------------------------..... ..- - - 2.5%
B. Section 1348 is Applicable
Application of the federal maximum 50 percent rate on earned income
will reduce the family's actual federal income tax paid from $30,487 to
$29,575, but will increase the net state tax burden from $2,537 to $2,985,
have preference income in excess of $30,000. See note 76 supra. For a full discussion
of the effects of preference income on the maximum tax on earned income, see Sunley,
The Maximum Tax on Earned Income, 27 NAT'L TAX J. 543 (1974).
78. See Table 2, Column 2 supra.
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and the net state tax burden as a percentage of AGI from 2.5 to 3 percent.
These figures are computed as follows:
1. Adjusted gross income (AGI) (all earned income) - $100,000
2. Exemptions - 3,000
3. Personal deductions (other than for state and local
income taxes paid) 16,000
4. Taxable income and earned taxable income (without
deduction for state and local income taxes paid) -- 81,000
5. Federal tax if no state or local income taxes paid
($18,060 on first $52,000 of taxable income plus 50
percent of excess over $52,000: i.e., $18,060 plus Y
[$81,000 less $52,000] ) -..-.......... .... ..... ... . 32,560
6. Federal tax bracket(s) from which $5,970 state and
local income taxes are deducted -------..----.-- 50%
7. Actual federal tax paid ($18,060 on first $52,000 of
taxable income plus 50 percent of excess over $52,000:
i.e., $18,060 plus 2 [$75,030 less $52,000] ) - ------- 29,575
8. Reduction in federal tax caused by deduction for state
and local income taxes (line 5 less line 7) 2,985
9. Net state tax burden ($5,970 [state and local tax
paid] less $2,985) 2,985
10. Net state tax burden as percentage of AGI (line 9
divided by line 1) 3%
Example 1I
A Maryland family of four has $200,000 of adjusted gross income.
$100,000 of that income is earned net income and $100,000 is dividend
income.7 9 Personal deductions (other than the deduction for state and
local income taxes paid) equal $32,000. The proposed rate schedule is in
effect in Maryland, so that the family owes state and local income taxes to
Maryland of $29,103.80
79. "Earned income" is defined in note 73 supra, and "earned net income" is defined
in note 76 supra. It is assumed in this example that the taxpayer does not have prefer-
ence income in excess of $30,000. See note 77 supra. The $100 exclusion for dividends
received is ignored.
80. See Table 2, Column 2 suPra.
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A. Section 1348 is Inapplicable
If section 1348 were not in the Internal Revenue Code, the family's
federal income tax liability and net state income tax burden would be
computed as follows:
1. Adjusted gross income (AGI) $200,000
2. Exemptions 3,000
3. Personal deductions (other than for state and local
income taxes paid) - 32,000
4. Taxable income (without deduction for state and local
income taxes paid) - 165,000
5. Federal tax if no state or local income taxes paid - 86,980
6. Federal tax bracket(s) from which $29,103 of state
and local income taxes are deducted 68%, 66% & 64%
7. Actual federal tax paid (i.e., based on $135,897 of
taxable income) - 67,754
8. Reduction in federal income tax caused by deduction
for state and local income taxes (line 5 less line 7) -- 19,226
9. Net state income tax burden ($29,103 [state and local
tax paid] less $19,226) - 9,877
10. Net state tax burden as percentage of AGI (line 9
divided by line 1) 4.9%o
B. Section 1348 is Applicable
Application of the federal maximum 50 percent rate on earned income
will reduce the family's actual federal income tax paid from $67,754 to
$67,197, but will increase the net state tax burden from $9,877 to $10,800,
and the net state tax burden as a percentage of AGI from 4.9 to 5.4 percent.
These figures are computed as follows:
1. Adjusted gross income (AGI) $200,000
Dividends $100,000
Earned net income $100,000
2. Exemptions - 3,000
3. Personal deductions (other than for state and local
income taxes paid) 32,000
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4. Taxable income (without deduction for state and local
income taxes paid) ----------------------- -- - ------..... .-----. 165,000
5. Percent earned net income is of AGI ($100,000/
$200,000) --------------------------------------------------------------------- 50%
6. Federal tax if no state or local income taxes paid
(tax based on $82,500 of earned taxable income and
$82,500 of other taxable income) --------- 85,5008'
7. Federal tax bracket(s) from which $29,103 of state
and local income taxes are deducted ---------- -- N/A
82
81. Line 6 was computed as follows:
6a. Earned taxable income without deduction for state and local
income taxes paid (50% of $165,000) -.................---- - -- -------- $82,500
6b. Regular tax on taxable income if no state and local income
taxes paid (tax on $165,000) 86,980
6c. Regular tax on earned taxable income if no state and local
income taxes paid (tax on $82,500) . . .34,790
6d. Tax on income not eligible for the 50% limit, if no state and
local income taxes paid (Line 6b less line 6c) 52,190
6e. Tax under 50% limit on earned taxable income (without de-
duction for state and local income taxes paid) :
(i) Tax on taxable income on which the tax
rate does not exceed 50% (i.e., tax on
$52,000) -- ---- $18,060
(ii) 50% -of earned taxable income (without de-
duction for state and local income taxes paid)
in excess of $52,000 ($82,500 less $52,000
equals $30,500) ----- - - --------........- - 15,250
33,310
6. Federal income tax if no state or local income taxes paid (Line
6d plus line 6e) . . ..................................................... . . . ._ $85,500
82. When either the 50 percent maximum tax is not applicable, or the 50 percent
maximum tax is applicable but AGI consists only of earned net income, it is possible
to set forth the marginal tax bracket or brackets from which state and local taxes
paid will be deducted. However, where AGI consists of both earned net income and
other income, the effect of any additional personal deductions on federal tax liability
can only be understood by observing the effect of that deduction on the three-step
process of computing tax under section 1348. See note 76 supra. For example, con-
sider the situation of a married couple with taxable income of $220,000 (without
considering a $20,000 deduction for state and local income taxes paid), made up
$110,000 of earned taxable income and $110,000 of other taxable income. It might
appear that an additional $20,000 personal deduction would be subtracted from a net
60 percent marginal tax bracket: i.e., $10,000 would be deducted from the maximum
50 percent marginal tax bracket applicable to earned income, and $10,000 would be
deducted from the top 70 percent bracket applicable to the other taxable income. In
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8. Actual federal tax paid (i.e., based on $135,897 of
taxable income, half of which [$67,949] is earned
taxable income and half of which [$67,949] is other
tax able in co m e ) ---- ---------- .-.. ... .. ... ... ..... .. 6 7 ,19 7 83
fact, however, federal income tax will be reduced by $12,800, or 64 percent of the
$20,000 additional deduction, as illustrated below:
Taxable Income Without Deduction
for $20,000 state and local income tax
Step 1 Tax--------- $ 18,060
[Tax on first $52,000 of
taxable income]
Step 2 Tax-....... 29,000
[50% of excess of earned
taxable income over $52,-
000 - 50% of $58,000
($110,000 less $52,000)]
Step 3 Tax. 73,600
[Tax on income not
eligible for 50% maxi-
mum limit - i.e., tax on
marginal income from
$110,000 to $220,000]
.--------- $120,660
Taxable Income After Deduction for
$20,000 state and local income tax
Step 1 Tax $ 18,060
[Tax on first $52,000 of
taxable income]
Step 2 Tax 24,000
[50% of excess of earned
taxable income over $52,-
000 - 50% of $48,000
($100,000 less $52,000)]
Step 3 Tax 65,800
[Tax on income not
eligible for 50% maxi-
mum limit - i.e., tax on
marginal income from
$100,000 to $200,000]
Total Tax $107,860
The $10,000 of the state and local income tax deduction applicable to Step 2 reduces
the Step 2 tax by $5,000 (from $29,000 to $24,000) or 50 percent of the $10,000 deduc-
tion. The $10,000 of the state and local income tax deduction applicable to Step 3,
however, reduces the Step 3 tax by $7,800 (from $73,600 to $65,800) or 78 percent of
the $10,000 deduction. The net result is a federal tax reduction of $12,800 (from
$120,660 to $107,860) which is 64 percent of the additional $20,000 deduction.
83. Line 8 was computed as follows:
8a. Earned taxable income (50% of $135,897) . $67,949
8b. Regular tax on taxable income (tax on $135,897) 67,754
8c. Regular tax on earned taxable income (tax on $67,949) ......... 26,592
8d. Tax on income not eligible for 50% limit (Line 8b less line 8c) 41,162
8e. Tax under 50% limit on earned taxable income ------ . 26,035
(i) Tax on taxable income on which the tax rate
does not exceed 50%o (i.e., tax on $52,000)-. $18,060
(ii) 50% of earned taxable income in excess of
$52,000 ($67,949 less $52,000 equals $15,949) 7,975
8. Actual federal income tax paid (Line 8d plus line 8e) ...... $67,197
Even though one-half of the additional deduction for state and local income
taxes will be allocable to earned income, and therefore, deducted from a maximum 50
Total Tax
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9. Reduction in federal income tax caused by deduction
for state and local income taxes (line 6 less line 8) -_
10. Net state tax burden ($29,103 [state and local tax
paid] less $18,303)
11. Net state tax burden as percentage of AGI (line 10
divided by line 1)
648
The following table illustrates the net state tax burden (under both
the existing and proposed Maryland rate schedules) borne by hypothetical
families of four with $100,000, $200,000 and $500,000 of AGI, with vary-
ing amounts of such AGI constituting earned net income. Each taxpayer is
assumed to have personal deductions (without taking into account state
and local income taxes paid) equal to 16 percent of AGI. 84
percent bracket, in total federal taxes will be reduced by $18,303 (from $85,500 to
$67,197) or 62.9 percent of the $29,103 additional deduction, as illustrated below:
Taxable Income Without Deduction
for $29,103 state and local income tax
Step 1 Tax
[Tax on first $52,000 of
taxable income]
Step 2Tax
[50% of excess of earned
taxable income over $52,-
000 - 50% of $30,500
($82,500 less $52,000)]
Step 3 Tax
[Tax on income not
eligible for 50% maxi-
mum limit - i.e., tax on
marginal income from
$82,500 to $165,000]
Total Tax
$18,060
15,250
52,190
$85,500
Taxable Income After Deduction for
$29,103 state and local income tax
Step 1 Tax . $18,060
[Tax on first $52,000 of
taxable income]
Step 2 Tax 7,975
[50% of excess of earned
taxable income over $52,-
000 - 50% of $15,949
($67,949 less $52,000)]
Step 3 Tax ------ 41,162
[Tax on income not
eligible for 50% maxi-
mum limit - i.e., tax on
marginal income from
$67,949 to $135,897]
Total Tax $67,197
The $14,551 (50 percent of $29,103) of the state and local income tax deduc-
tion applicable to Step 2 reduces the Step 2 tax by $7,275 (from $15,250 to $7,975) or
50 percent of the $14,551 deduction. The $14,551 of the state and local income tax
deduction applicable to Step 3, however, reduces the Step 3 tax by $11,028 (from
$52,190 to $41,162) or 75.8 percent of the $14,551 deduction. The net result is the
federal tax reduction of $18,303 (from $85,500 to $67,197), which is 62.9 percent of the
additional $29,103 deduction.
84. It is assumed in Appendix Table 1 that the taxpayers do not have preference
income in excess of $30,000. See note 76 supra.
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APPENDIX TABLE I
No part of AGI represents Lower of Lower of
income is sub- $200,000 or $300,000 orject to fifty $100,000 of AGI represents AGI represents
percent maxi- earned net earned net earned netAGI mum rate on income income income
earned income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Part I (Existing Rates) (Percent)
$100,000 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0
200,000 2.0 2.4 3.1 3.1
500,000 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.6
Part II (Proposed Rates) (Percent)
$100,000 5.3 6.1 6.1 6.1
200,000 4.9 5.4 7.3 7.3
500,000 4.9 5.1 6.0 6.9
NOTE: In computing both the state tax paid (which includes the fifty percent local
piggyback tax), and the reduction in federal tax paid caused by the state income tax
deduction, it was assumed that: (1) all taxpayers had itemized deductions of 16
percent of AGI without taking into account the state tax paid; (2) all income was
earned by one spouse; (3) the taxpayers did not have tax preference items in excess of
$30,000; and (4) all income and itemized deductions (other than the state income tax)
were includible income and allowable deductions for both federal and state tax
purposes.
CONCLUSION
Effect of Maximum Tax Under Existing Maryland Rates
The federal maximum 50 percent rate on earned income has minimal
effect on the net state tax burden borne by a high income taxpayer under
the existing Maryland rates. Appendix Table I (Part I) indicates that,
under existing rates, the net state tax burden on high income persons does
not rise much higher than 3 percent, even when the federal maximum
tax on earned income is considered. This 3 percent net state tax burden
remains significantly lower than that borne by many lower income itemizers
and users of the standard deduction.
Effect of Maximum Tax Under Proposed
Highly Graduated Rates
The federal maximum tax on earned income would have a more
significant effect on the net state tax burdens of high-bracket taxpayers
(and therefore on the overall progressivity of the state tax system)
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were the highly graduated proposed rate schedule adopted in Maryland.
Appendix Table I (Part II) shows, however, that even under the proposed
rates, the net state tax burden of a high-income taxpayer would not be
significantly affected by the maximum tax unless that taxpayer had not
only a high AGI (above $100,000), but also an AGI which consisted
mainly of earned net income. Finally, because only about one-third of all
taxpayers with AGI above $100,000 report any income subject to the 50
percent maximum rate,8 5 the net state tax burdens of two-thirds of all
high-bracket taxpayers remain entirely unaffected by the 50 percent maxi-
mum tax.
85. See note 73 supra.
